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I. INTRODUCTION 
Few economic events of the early 1970s have attracted more attention 
than the large increases in taxes or quasi-taxes levied upon primary products, 
especially natural resources, by a small number of countries that control 
large segments of world markets for these commodities. The most important 
case, of course, is petroleum. The actions of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) have caused chaos in the economies of 
developed as well as developing nations, and may yet wreck the inter-
national monetary system. Even worse, many already desperately poor 
countries have been further impoverished by paying higher prices for im-
ports of primary products, particularly fossil fuels. Of course, we tend to 
think of the gains from the increases in taxes as accruing primarily to the 
low-density countries of the Middle East, many of which already enjoy 
extraordinarily high per capita incomes. But several poor countries such as 
Indonesia and Nigeria have also been able to improve their economic status 
at the expense of the developed countries-although also at the expense of 
other poor countries-so that the tax increases do not necessarily make the 
worldwide distribution of income less equal. 
Looking with envy at the success of OPEC and other earlier, but less 
spectacular, instances of cooperative action by producer countries, other 
countries have sought to duplicate the success of these cartels, in commodities 
ranging from bananas to mercury and copper. 1 The success or failure of 
such further efforts to form cartels will, of course, have distributional impli-
cations roughly similar to those of the OPEC cartel. The colluding countries 
will improve their positions at the expense of either consuming nations or 
creditor nations if they are successful in shifting the new taxes from their own 
people to people of other countries. Many, but not all, of the producing 
countries are in the developing world, and most of the nations that supply 
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capital are in the developed world. Thus backward shifting of the taxes to 
owners of capital would generally tend to equalize the worldwide distribution 
of ·income. On the other hand, as noted above, consuming nations are both 
rich and poor, so that forward shifting to consumers has less clear-cut 
distributional effects. But one thing stands out in the discussion to this point. 
If we are to know how the taxes under discussion affect the worldwide 
distribution of income, we must know their incidence, that is, whether they 
can be shifted, and in which direction. 
We propose some guidelines based on economic analysis of the deter-
minants of the incidence of taxes on natural resources and other primary 
products. In section II we discuss the conditions under which various kinds 
of taxes on primary products can be shifted forward and backward to non-
residents of the taxing nations. Then in section III we apply the framework 
developed earlier to analyze one specific case, beginning with the large tax 
Jamaica imposed upon bauxite in the summer of 1974. We believe that the 
general framework and this example will assist the reader in appraising the 
likely incidence of various other taxes on primary products (or the chances 
of success of other attempts at cartelization). 2 
II. THE GENERAL DETERMINANTS OF INCIDENCE 
Table 1 (p. 149) presents the general determinants of the incidence of 
taxes on natural resources. Because this table and its explanation employ a 
bit of the economist's shorthand notation, it seems convenient to digress 
from the main subject long enough to explain a few uf the terms used in this 
table and the remainder of the paper. 3 
A. Definitions 
Resource rents are earned by owners of an asset (such as a natural re-
source) that is provided by nature and that has no alternative use. 
Differential resource rents exist when favorable conditions such as low 
transportation costs, ease of extraction of the resource, high quality ores, 
etc., result in higher resource rents than are generally available. 
Quasi-rents are earned on capital that is invested in some activity, and that, 
being specific to such use, has no alternative use in the short run. In the long 
run, as capital depreciates and funds become available for other investments, 
they will be employed in activities in which it is expected that they can earn 
a normal return. If an investment is particularly good, the resulting quasi-
rents exceed normal returns during the subsequent short run, but if the in-
vestment is less successful (or is rendered so by tax policy) quasi-rents can 
fall below the normal return expected when the investment was undertaken. 
Finally, monopoly rents occur when barriers to entry into an industry allow 
the firms already in the industry to charge prices high enough to earn extra-
ordinarily high returns on their investments, even in the long run, because of 
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the lack of any threat of competition from new entrants. Monopoly rents are 
found more frequently in oligopolistic industries, in which a few firms 
dominate an industry, than in the relatively rare cases of non-governmental 
pure monopoly, in which there is but one firm in the industry. 
B. Market Dominance 
The first determinant of the ability to shift taxes on natural resources is 
the position of the taxing nation or nations in the relevant market for the 
taxed resource. One nation producing a small portion of the world's supply 
of a mineral, for example, could not hope to export a tax on that mineral to 
nonresident consumers through higher prices, because the world price would 
be almost totally unaffected by the nation's imposition of the tax. Rather, 
the tax would reduce returns to producers of the mineral in the short run 
and perhaps render production unprofitable in the long run, as discussed 
further below. On the other hand, a nation or group of cooperating nations 
responsible for the entire world production of a product might be able to 
shift a substantial portion of any tax on that product to consumers in other 
countries. Of course, the most common cases are in the middle ground of · 
partial dominance, since few, if any, important products are completely 
dominated by one country and cartels are at least as difficult to organize and 
maintain among countries as they are among firms. 4 Finally, we must note 
explicitly that the relevant market for a commodity may not always be easy 
to demarcate, because of the presence of substitutes of various degrees of 
perfection. As we shall note below, for example, aluminum may be easily 
replaced by glass and steel in the container market and is competitive with 
copper in the electrical industry, but has no rivals in the production of 
aircraft. 
C. Mobility of Factors 
If capital is not mobile out of a taxing country, or even out of a taxed 
industry within the country, it is essentially earning quasi-rents, according 
to the definition given in part A of this section. In such a case, any tax that 
cannot be shifted simply reduces these quasi-rents and is borne by investors 
in the taxed industry. If, on the other hand, capital is mobile, either out of 
the taxing nation or out of the taxed industry, it can largely escape the tax. 
Since much mining and refining equipment is not easily transferred to other 
domestic uses and since it is often difficult or prohibitively expensive to 
dismantle such machinery and move it out of the taxing nation (even if the 
nation would permit such a response to its tax policy), the question of 
capital mobility basically hinges on whether we are discussing the short run 
or the long run of economic theory. Whereas in the short run capital is 
fixed and earning quasi-rents, in the long run depreciation of facilities 
generally renders capital mobile. 5 
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Labor may also be relatively immobile in response to taxes that are shifted 
backwards to it, for several reasons. For example, a certain group may, by 
tradition, work in the mines and mills of a country and continue to do so 
even following a tax-induced reduction in wages. Other cultural factors, 
such as geographical preferences or discrimination in other occupations, 
may limit groups to the taxed industries. In such cases these workers are 
essentially immobile and, like the owners of immobile capital, they earn 
quasi-rents, rather than wages determined competitively in the nationwide 
market. A somewhat different situation occurs in those instances in which 
unionization has resulted in workers receiving wages above the competitive 
wage rate. In such cases the worker is not immobile in quite the same sense 
as in the previously discussed case, but the results are similar: the worker is 
receiving a form of monopoly rent and will not, within limits, leave the 
industry even if his wage is reduced somewhat by the backwards shifting of 
the tax levied on his employer. 6 
Finally, we should note that in most cases the natural resource is itself 
highly immobile in the sense that it may have little alternative use. To the 
extent that this is true, the resource is earning resource rents which are a 
highly vulnerable target for countries wanting to raise additional revenues, 
perhaps at the expense of nonresidents, while avoiding undesirable economic 
consequences. As noted below, the type of tax, the economics of transporting 
the resource, and institutional factors are important determinants of the 
extent to which a given tax will come to rest on resource rents. 
D. Industrial Structure 
The incidence of a particular tax is likely to depend in important ways 
upon the extent to which the market is dominated by a few firms, as well as 
the extent of dominance by taxing countries. In particular, a tax levied on a 
competitive industry by dominant nations is more likely to be shifted in full 
to consumers than is a similar tax levied upon a monopolist. The reason for 
this apparently anomalous result is that the monopolist would presumably 
have maximized his profits in the absence of the tax. In that case, part of the 
tax would cut into his monopoly profits, rather than being shifted to con-
sumers. In general we expect that about half the tax would come out of profits 
and only about half would be reflected in higher prices. 7 
Of course, as suggested above, monopoly is rare, and in the world of natural 
resources, perfect competition is, too. The more common form of industrial 
structure is oligopoly. Unfortunately, economic theory can tell us little about 
the price response of an oligopolistic industry to an increase in the taxes it 
pays-or more accurately, it can tell us just about anything, depending upon 
the assumptions we make about the behavior of the firms (that is, upon which 
theory of oligopoly we accept). This is not the place to attempt a taxonomy 
of the many theories of oligopoly and their implications for tax incidence. a 
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Rather, we simply note that if the industry has maximized the joint profits of 
its member firms, the results will resemble those of the monopoly case, but 
if it has not, the results will be more like those of the competitive case. 9 
Finally, as noted above, unionization may result in workers receiving a 
form of monopoly rent. But unionization and industrial concentration tend 
to go together. Moreover, multinational firms tend to pay more than the 
local wage rate, even in the absence of union pressures, in order to reduce 
turnover, avoid labor discontent, etc. Thus workers may be sharing in the 
monopoly and resource rents of their employers. 
E. Type ofT ax 
Taxes and quasi-taxes on natural resources can take a multitude of forms, 
but we shall restrict our attention to two general forms: the production tax 
and the income or profits tax.Io The production tax, if levied by nations 
that dominate the market, would be shifted forward in large part. On the 
other hand, if it were levied by a non-dominant nation, the tax would be 
likely to reduce the quasi-rents of owners of immobile capital in the short 
run. It would tend to discourage continuation of production in the taxing 
nation in the long run, unless there were some mitigating factor such as 
differential resource rents that could be tapped through backward shifting. 
Of course, it is possible that some of the burdens on capital would be shared 
by labor specific to the taxed industry. 
The situation is somewhat different where income taxes are concerned. 
For one thing, there are problems of the transfer price appropriate to use 
for intra-firm transactions in calculating taxable profits (especially those of 
multinational firms) that are less critical in the case of production taxes. 
Second, from a theoretical point of view, the incidence of profits taxes is 
considerably more uncertain than is that of production taxes. Beyond that, 
income taxes are levied on the entire return to capital, including normal 
returns to equity capital, as well as pure profits (monopoly rents, in the present 
discussion). Thus these taxes are likely to have economic effects somewhat 
different from those of a tax on pure profits. In particular, to the extent that 
the tax drives the return to equity capital below what can be earned on 
alternative investments, it, too, would discourage investment in refining in the 
taxing nation, even though in the short run it would merely reduce the various 
rents. Finally, foreign tax credits are generally available only for income 
taxes. As long as income taxes do not exceed amounts allowed as foreign tax 
credits by capital-exporting nations, those nations bear the full burden of 
income taxes levied by the natural resource-producing nations. Similarly the 
existence of full crediting reduces the amount of tax that must be borne by 
either consumers or recipients of factor incomes. Therefore, in what follows 
we consider only income (profits) taxes (and other taxes) that are not 
credited. 
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F. Final Considerations 
Several additional determinants of the incidence of taxation of natural 
resources do not fit easily into the taxonomy of table 1, and would make it 
undesirably complicated, even if they did. For example, it matters greatly 
whether contractual arrangements can be altered in response to changes in 
tax policy. Examples of contracts that might be altered are labor contracts, 
supply contracts, lease arrangements, etc. Moreover, it is important to know 
whether the natural resource can be exported for processing elsewhere if 
local processors attempt to shift taxes backward to the mining stage. In some 
cases economic considerations, especially weight loss and costs of transpor-
tation, dictate on-site processing, but in others they do not. In addition, 
there may be restrictions on the export of unprocessed natural resources, 
especially if the country is experiencing severe problems with excess capacity 
in its own processing plants. The importance of the resource cost in the total 
costs of final products is an important determinant of the possibilities of 
shifting a tax forward to consumers. Clearly the tax can be shifted more 
easily if the resource is a relatively minor component of the cost of final 
products. Beyond that, the existence of differential resource rents is an 
important determinant of whether heavy taxes can be levied without render-
ing the industry economically non-viable in the taxing nation. A final 
consideration is purely mechanical. Once we have identified the consumers 
and factor owners who bear the various taxes we must allocate the taxes to 
their nations of residence. 
G. The Taxonomy 
If we ignore severance taxes, suppress repeated mention that labor may 
share in the burden of some taxes (especially in unionized industries and in 
industries with substantial amounts of resource rents and monopoly rents), 
and ignore the existence of differential resource rents, we can identify the 
twelve cases presented in table 1. As in the previous discussion, we distinguish 
between the owners of resources and the capitalists who exploit the resources 
and process them, though the two groups may, in reality, be largely the 
same in many cases. The first group receives resource rents, including 
differential resource rents. The second receives normal returns to capital in 
the long run, quasi-rents in the short run, and perhaps monopoly rents. 
Case 1: Production taxes levied on competitive industries by nations 
dominating the world market for a resource would be shifted in large part to 
consumers, if capital is mobile. In each case examined, income taxes would 
be borne by owners of natural resources to the extent that they applied to 
resource rents. But that part of income taxes falling on the normal return to 
equity capital would be likely to be shifted to consumers, since any tendency 
to reduce the return to capital would resultin capital being invested in other 
industries, perhaps in other countries. 
I. 
II. 
III. 
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TABLE I 
GENERAL DETERMINANTS OF THE INCIDENCE 
OFT AXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES 
Market dominance by taxing nations Yes 
Capital mobility from taxed sector Yes No 
Industrial structure 
a. Competition I 4 
b. Monopoly 2 5 
c. Oligopoly 3 6 
No 
Yes No 
7 lO 
8 ll 
9 12 
Case 2: Only about half of the production tax levied on the monopolist 
would be shifted to consumers, even if the taxing nations dominated the 
market. The remainder would be borne by recipients of monopoly rents. 
To the extent that it applied to economic profits, the profits or income tax 
would be borne by capitalists. To the extent that the tax hit the normal 
return to capital, the result would be similar to the analogous part of the 
tax in the competitive industry. The existence of monopoly rents in the 
taxed industry might make that industry more attractive than other invest-
ment opportunities, however, so long as the tax does not completely offset 
that attraction. Thus in a particular case it is important to know the magnitude 
of the monopoly rents in the industry and to compare them with the size of 
the taxes tending to reduce the return to capital. 
Case 3: As suggested earlier, the results for oligopoly are likely to 
resemble those for either monopoly or competition, depending upon the 
extent to which profits of the industry have been maximized in the absence 
of the tax. 
Cases 4-6: With capital completely immobile, a tax either on production 
or on the profits of refiners is likely to be borne by recipients of quasi-rents 
and, where relevant, by recipients of monopoly rents. Given existing patterns 
of ownership of processing capacity, such a tax would result in substantial 
amounts of short-run exporting of taxes to capitalists in developed countries. 
Thus in either the long run or the short run nations that dominate world 
markets for important products are likely to be able to export taxes on 
those products. But the implications for the worldwide distribution of 
income are somewhat different in the two cases. In the short-run (capital 
immobile) case the primary burden is likely to be on capitalists, a group 
which can be characterized with reasonable accuracy as the upper income 
groups in the developed nations. But in the long run the burden comes to be 
borne increasingly by consumers, that is, by lower income groups in the 
developed nations and in increasing proportions by citizens of the poorer 
countries. It 
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Case 7: In this case a country that does not dominate the world market 
levies a tax on processing of a natural resource, even though the capital 
employed in the processing industry is mobile. Because of non-dominance 
the tax cannot be shifted to consumers, and because capital is mobile neither 
form of tax can reduce the normal return to capital, which in a competitive 
industry is the only return capital receives. If the taxed resource cannot be 
exported in unprocessed form, say because of transportation costs or 
government regulations, the tax may be shifted backward to owners of the 
natural resource. But if the resource can be exported for processing else-
where, the tax may well destroy the refining industry in the taxing nation. 
If this occurs, the burden of the tax may fall largely upon labor, due to the 
reduction in the country's capital-labor ratio and the need to absorb the 
released labor elsewhere.I2 
Case 8: This case is remarkably similar to the competitive case. Economic 
theory tells us that profits are maximized when marginal cost (the incre-
mental cost of producing a unit of output) equals marginal revenue. But if 
the taxing nation does not dominate the world market, marginal revenues 
are determined in the world market. Thus the tax has no effect on the profit-
maximizing price and is therefore not shifted to consumers. And because 
capital is completely mobile, by assumption, the tax cannot reduce the 
normal return the monopolist receives, though it may reduce monopoly 
rents. Thus in this case, as in case 7, either a processing tax or a profits tax 
on processing will tend to depress the processing indus try in the taxing nation, 
unless conditions are such that it can be shifted backward to owners of 
natural resources or that it simply reduces monopoly rents. 
Case 9: As in cases 7 and 8, either tax would be borne by recipients of 
resource rents (and perhaps labor) if conditions allowed, and would tend to 
destroy the industry if not. 
Case 10: The price of output is determined in world markets, because of 
non-dominance, and capital is fixed in supply to the taxing nation, and 
therefore earning quasi-rents. Either a production tax or a profits tax reduces 
those quasi-rents. Of course, this is only short-run analysis, and it is to be 
expected that in the long run the results will be as described in case 7. 
Cases 11 and 12: These cases have results similar to those in case 10, with 
the added feature that monopoly rents will be reduced as well. The important 
distinction between these three cases and the three previous cases is that the 
passage of time tends to concentrate the burden of the tax upon workers 
and owners of resources as capitalists remove (or threaten to remove) their 
processing facilities in response to a tax that makes their continued invest-
ment in the taxing nation unprofitable. This may or may not result in a more 
progressive domestic tax burden and increased exporting of the tax, de-
pending upon the patterns of incidence and the ownership of the natural 
resources and processing facilities. But because dominance is necessary (if 
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not sufficient) for shifting tax burdens to consumers and because ownership 
of both resources and processing facilities is concentrated in the developed 
countries, it is virtually certain that taxes levied by nondominant nations 
will have a more egalitarian effect on the worldwide distribution of income 
than those levied by dominant nations. Finally, it appears that cases I 
through 3, in which we find both market dominance and factor mobility, 
are quite different from cases 4 through 12. In the first group of cases con-
sumers, including those in poor countries, are likely to bear a considerable 
burden of any taxes on natural resources. In the other cases the absence of 
either market dominance or capital mobility, or both, results in difficulties 
in shifting either a tax on production or a tax on profits in the processing 
industry forward to consumers. To the·extent that capitalists and owners of 
resources are concentrated in the developed countries and in the upper 
income classes in all countries, natural resources taxes levied in the context 
of cases 4 through 12 are likely to make both the distributions of income 
within countries and the worldwide distribution of income more equal. 
III. THE BAUXITE CASE 
From 1901 through 1936, there were six major cartel agreements between 
companies in the international trade of aluminum, all of which seem to 
have been successful in raising prices significantly above what would have 
been expected in the absence of the agreements.JJ Until 1974 there were no 
examples of international commodity agreements or cartel-like arrange-
ments in bauxite, the principal ore from which aluminum oxide (alumina) is 
refined for later smelting into aluminum ingot. In March 1974, however, 
seven major bauxite producing nations (Australia, Guinea, Guyana, Ja-
maica, Sierra Leone, Surinam, and Yugoslavia) took the first formal steps, 
in Conarky, Guinea, for establishing the International Bauxite Association 
(IBA). By November 1974, the IBA was fully established, with permanent 
headquarters in Kingston, Jamaica, and three new members (The Dominican 
Republic, Ghana, and Haiti) had been admitted to membership. 14 The 
only significant developing-country producer still outside the IBA fold is 
Indonesia, whose 1973 production was about 2% of world mine output. 15 
Although the members have steadfastly avoided using the "cartel" label 
for IBA, and have not yet taken simultaneous coordinated actions, the 
goals of IBA (securing higher revenues from bauxite and alumina and 
developing vertically integrated aluminum industries in member countries) 
are not atypical of past cartels formed by producing firms. Following the 
initial IBA meetings, however, Jamaica announced in May 1974 unilateral 
actions designed to expand its bauxite revenues by U.S. $170 million per 
year, or about 50% of total tax receipts fQr 1973-74. The measure served to 
raise the nation's tax revenue (exclusive of royalties of U.S. $0.55 per ton) 
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from bauxite from about $1.34 to about $10.50 per ton, an increase of almost 
700%. The government also announced its intention to secure a sizable 
increase in participation in the bauxite and alumina operations of the large 
international aluminum firms present in that country, which together hold 
under lease or ownership some 1.5 billion tons of bauxite reserves, or over 
80% of estimated Jamaican reserves. 16 Because of the difficulty of deter-
mining profits attributable to operations in Jamaica, the new tax was levied 
on production, rather than on profits. And because of the difficulties in 
determining an arms-length or free market price for bauxite, the tax was 
geared to the price of aluminum ingot (7.5% of the realized price, as deter-
mined by the government, on shipments of primary aluminum for 1974-75, 
to rise in steps to 8.5% by 1976). Finally, to forestall the possibility that the 
aluminum companies might counter by reducing production, the tax was 
based on a presumed minimum level of production equal to somewhat over 
90% of estimated production. 
Within two months of Jamaica's unilateral actions, Guyana announced 
virtually identical taxes, 17 and the Dominican Republic was considering 
similar measures. 18 Surinam implemented changes nearly matching those of 
Jamaica in mid-December 1974, enacting taxes of about $10.00 per ton, 
retroactive to January I, 1974.19 Finally, in early 1975, Guinea and Haiti 
imposed stiffer bauxite levies modeled along the lines of the Jamaican 
measures.2o Of the ten IBA members, only Australia, Sierra Leone, and 
Yugoslavia had refrained, as of this writing, from announcing tax increases 
on a scale comparable to the Jamaican levies. (But the executive board of 
IBA intends to forge a common pricing formula for batlxite by no later than 
November 1975.)21 
There is little doubt that the Jamaican government, as well as the govern-
ments of other IBA members which followed the Jamaican initiative, ex-
pected the increase in the tax to be borne by foreigners. In this section we 
utilize the conceptual framework developed in the previous section to 
determine whether this is a reasonable expectation. The focus is, naturally 
enough, upon the existence of market dominance and upon the presence of 
resource rents, quasi-rents, and monopoly rents. It will be convenient to 
reverse the order in which industrial structure and capital mobility are 
considered. 
A. Dominance 
Aluminum is the most plentiful metal found in the earth's crust (8% of the 
earth's crust by weight) and occurs in bauxite and all clays.22 Aluminum-
bearing materials other than bauxite have not been extensively exploited, 
however, as their low aluminum oxide content (and I or high silica content) 
relative to the bauxite deposits found in IBA nations has rendered derivation 
of alumina from these materials a much more costly proposition. 23 Bauxite 
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is still the cheapest source of aluminum, but known world reserves of bauxite 
are sufficient to support 268 years of world aluminum needs at 1973 levels of 
production, so that the ore hardly qualifies as an example of "rare earth." 
Fully 63% of world bauxite reserves, however, are located in the territory of 
the original seven IBA members, who also accounted for 62% of world mine 
production in 1973. The U.S . has only about I% of world bauxite reserves,24 
while other non-communist nations outside of IBA account for less than one 
third of world reserves and less than one quarter of 1973 production. Aus-
tralia alone accounts for 30% of world bauxite reserves, followed by Guinea 
at 23% and Jamaica at nearly 7%. Within IBA, three of the ten members are 
responsible for a heavy share of total world production. In 1973, Australia 
(23%), Jamaica (20%), and Surinam (10%) accounted for 53% of world 
mine production (see table 2). 
TABLE 2 
WORLD BAUXITE PRODUCTION 1973 
(Percentage of Totals) 
I. IBA Members 
I. Australia 
2. Jamaica 
3. Surinam 
4. Guyana 
5. Guinea 
6. Yugoslavia 
7. Sierra Leone 
8. Other IBA members 
(Haiti, Ghana, 
Dominican Republic) 
II. RestofWorld 
I. Indonesia 
2. U.S.S.R. 
3. France 
4. United States 
5. Other nations 
a Authors' estimate. 
bDepartment of Mining, Republic of Indonesia. 
SouRCE: Unless otherwise indicated, Commodity Yearbook, 1974. 
68.7 
22.7 
20.0 
9.9 
5.1 
4.3 
3.2a 
l.Oa 
2.5a 
31.3 
1.8b 
6.9 
4.5 
2.7 
15.4 
The four largest producers of bauxite have a particularly strong position, 
especially in their primary markets, even without the support of other IBA 
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members. The Caribbean producers in general enjoy an especially advan-
tageous position in the U.S. market. Jamaica and Surinam alone accounted 
for 75% of U.S. bauxite imports in 1973. For the period 1968-1972, the four 
most important Caribbean producers (Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana, and the 
Dominican Republic) accounted for fully 91% of U.S. imports of bauxite, 
or about 80% of U.S. mine production plus imports.25 
These facts, and others considered briefly below, suggest that IBA nations 
can export a substantial portion of their recent increases in taxes on bauxite. 
Most obviously, tax exporting to foreign consumers may be possible at 
least in the short- to medium-term. This conclusion would be strengthened 
by Australian support of common pricing formulas favored by other IBA 
members, but may be weakened by considerations of industrial structure.26 
Perhaps equally important, locational and other advantages of the Caribbean 
deposits create important differential rents that are particularly vulnerable 
to appropriation through fiscal measures. 
Although Jamaican deposits contain only 50% alumina (about equal to 
that of much of the Australian and Indonesian deposits), they enjoy signifi-
cant advantages of physical accessibility, low silica content (bauxites with 
low silica content are the cheapest to process by the Bayer method) and low 
transport costs. Guyana's deposits are less accessible (owing to a heavy 
overburden of sand and clay). The alumina content of Guyana's ore (57%) 
is the highest in the world for major deposits, however, and the country has 
a virtual monopoly on calcined bauxite (used in the abrasives and refractory 
industries). Discovery and exploitation of sizable new bauxite fields of 
comparable quality and accessibility does not appear likely to exert signifi-
cant downward pressure on differential resource rents of Caribbean deposits 
through the medium term. The few known large, unexploited deposits are 
distant from the markets of Jamaica, Guyana, and Surinam (and are located 
in other IBA nations, or in nations likely to join IBA, such as Indonesia). 
The nature of alumina refining-which involves substantial weight reduc-
tion (typically 50%)-also generates differential locational rents, above 
those accruing to bauxite deposits, as such. Recent and projected increases 
in shipping costs are expected to increase the premium for processing 
alumina near extraction sites. 
B. Industrial Structure 
The international aluminum industry is dominated by six major producers 
(Alcoa, Alcan, Kaiser, Reynolds, Pechiney, and Alusuisse), who together 
held 66% of the net equity ownership of western capacity (1970) in primary 
aluminum27 and an undetermined but probably equally large share in net 
equity in bauxite mining and refining. The six major producers are all fully 
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integrated from bauxite to metal and are active in mining and processing 
activities throughout the world , often through joint ventures with one 
another and with smaller companies. American and Canadian firms have a 
relatively greater role in the Caribbean, European firms tend to dominate in 
Africa, and nearly all have substantial investments in Australia and the Far 
East. Concentration in aluminum smelting has declined since 1950. 28 But the 
substantial economies of large-scale production at this stage, in which 
(before the energy crisis) 60% of total aluminum cost was incurred, still 
work to the advantage of the major producers. The six major firms control 
80% of western-world primary aluminum capacity, about half of world 
trade in bauxite, alumina, and aluminum, and a large share of fabrication 
capacity. 29 Given the preponderance of the majors at all stages of bauxite-
alumina-aluminum markets and their predilection for cooperative behavior, 
which is facilitated by participation in joint ventures among the six, it is 
hardly arguable that substantial potential exists for monopoly and monop-
sony rents from Caribbean mining activity. The existence of monopoly 
rents, of course, reduces the possibility of shifting to consumers, but increases 
that of exporting the tax to non-resident capitalists. 
C. Capital Mobility 
In the short run quasi-rents accrue to the multinational firms engaged in 
the mining of bauxite or the refining of alumina. The package of inputs 
earning quasi-rents includes not only capital, but the associated technological, 
management, and (often) labor skills required for modern, capital-intensive 
mining. Given the longevity of the substantial amounts of capital invested 
($800 million in Jamaica, for example30), the "short run" of economic 
theory may turn out to be lengthy, and the appropriation of quasi-rents 
could be the vehicle of considerable tax exporting. In addition, several of 
the major international firms have invested heavily in alumina refining in 
IBA nations. As most of these refineries are designed to process specific 
grades of bauxite, adapting them to different grades of . bauxite, not to 
mention non-bauxite aluminum-bearing materials, would require large 
investments. Thus capital invested in alumina refining is not likely to be 
highly mobile. But while the multinational firms can do little in the short 
run to combat the reduction of their quasi- (and other) rents,JI in the long 
run they can move, especially if the tax policies of the bauxite-producing 
nations are not fully coordinated . Whether in the long run capital is driven 
out depends in large part on whether (and the extent that) increased taxes 
on bauxite go beyond the mere capturing of differential resource rents plus 
a portion of monopoly rents, and encroach upon the normal return to 
capital and technical knowledge and skills. 
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D. Other Considerations 
1. Ordinary Demand and Cost Considerations 
The recent fiscal measures enacted by the bauxite producing nations of the 
Caribbean provide a good example of the importance of being unimportant. 
Bauxite costs as a proportion of ingot costs (before 1974) have been placed 
at l 0%, while the costs of refining alumina and smelting are 18-20% and 
60-70%, respectively.32 Therefore, the Jamaican tax increase would, if fully 
passed forward, raise ingot prices by only about two cents per pound, or by 
6% over prices prevailing in July 1974.33 Whether a price increase of this 
magnitude would induce substantial short-term shifts away from aluminum, 
the second most used metal in the U.S., is difficult to determine. 34 The con-
ductivity, strength-to-weight, corrosion-resistance, and formability of alumi-
num suggest that existing substitutes, such as steel, copper, and plastics, 
would not be likely to make substantial inroads into aluminum's markets. 
Costs of replacing aluminum in transport and electrical applications would 
be particularly high, although substitution could easily be achieved in the 
beverage and container industry (16% of the aluminum market). Finally, 
scrap supplied about 19% of total U.S. aluminum production in 1972-73.35 
Tax-induced increases in aluminum prices could spur recycling efforts, but 
this is quite a limited source of supply, except in the short run. 
Probably the major source of concern for the Caribbean members of IBA 
is the possibility of longer-term displacement of bauxite by other aluminum-
bearing materials in abundant supply in the U.S. and elsewhere in the 
developed world. The U.S. is rich in aluminum-bearing clays, such as nephe-
line synite, and has substantial deposits of alunite and anorthosite. But the 
alumina content of these ores is, at between 30% and 38%, significantly 
lower than that of most Caribbean, and for that matter, most IBA deposits 
(except the low silica deposits of trihydrate bauxite in Australia, with an 
alumina content of 35%). Furthermore, from all accounts the technology for 
extracting alumina from non-bauxite materials is still in the pilot-study 
stage. The U.S. also has very large dawsonite resources, contained in the 
same formations as oil shale in the Rocky Mountains. If the U.S. were to opt 
for a policy of extracting oil from shale, dawsonite (with an alumina content 
of 35%) would be a sizable by-product, and could supply the world's alumi-
num needs for decades. The possibility of competition from dawsonite would 
seem to pose little threat to IBA members, however, at least at present tax 
levels. On the contrary, if IBA members were convinced that the U.S. intends 
to exploit its oil shale reserves, they would be well advised to raise taxes on 
bauxite even further, in order to extract the maximum rents before large-
scale generation of dawsonite or dramatic technical change in aluminum 
refining and smelting renders their bauxite deposits worthless. 36 
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2. Type ofT ax 
As noted earlier, Jamaica, Guyana, and other IBA members levied higher 
production taxes, rather than profits taxes, on bauxite producers. This is 
rather difficult to explain, since foreign tax credits are generally available 
only for income taxes. But beyond that, it is necessary to notice that the 
Jamaican tax is no ordinary production tax in that it presumes a minimum 
level of production. Thus it is in effect a lump sum tax if production falls 
below the stipulated level and is truly related to production only after the 
presumed minimum is surpassed. This feature prevents the majors from 
holding Jamaica hostage by temporarily shifting production to their mines 
in other countries and thereby depressing the Jamaican economy. To the 
contrary, Jamaica in effect is holding the firms hostage. As the tax must be 
paid, whether bauxite is mined or not, the only economical thing to do, for 
the time being, is to mine at least the minimum level stipulated by law. 
E. Summary 
Jamaica and other Caribbean members of IBA effectively dominate the 
North American bauxite market and are behaving in a consciously parallel, 
if not collusive manner. IBA members as a whole could dominate the world 
bauxite market if Australia should fully support IBA goals. Moreover, the 
industrial structure is oligopolistic. Thus in the short run, in which capital 
is essentially immobile, we are dealing with case 6 of our conceptual frame-
work. Over the long run, market dominance may weaken (if the tax ultimately 
renders Caribbean or other IBA bauxite non-competitive) or it may increase 
(if IBA becomes a strong worldwide cartel). Thus, in the long run we are 
dealing with either case 3 or case 9. In case 3 we would expect substantial 
(say 50-100%) shifting to consumers; depending upon the behavior of the 
oligopolistic firms that dominate the world and U.S. markets, substantial 
short-run shifting to consumers might occur even in case 6. Recipients of 
resource and monopoly rents would bear the remainder of the burden in 
these cases, and they and recipients of quasi-rents would bear the full burden 
if case 9 turns out to be relevant. Given consumption patterns and the effec-
tive ownership of the major aluminum firms and Caribbean bauxite deposits, 
there seems to be little doubt that substantial amounts of the new bauxite 
taxes can be exported in both the short run and the long run, subject only to 
constraints imposed by weakness of the IBA and (if IBA proves to be im-
potent) the level of differential resource rents. 
Whether the IBA will be a viable cartel is, of course, unpredictable. And 
because of the lack of generally recognized arms-length prices for bauxite, 
it is not possible without further detailed analysis to determine precisely 
whether the recent tax increases in Jamaica and other IBA nations have 
served to wrest away the entire amount of differential resource rent accruing 
to their bauxite deposits. Similarly, it is also impossible to determine the 
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size of monopoly rents in mining activity, because of the complexities of 
marketing and pricing and the nature of oligopolistic interaction between 
multinational enterprises. But the behavior of several of these firms provides 
some operational evidence that in fact Jamaica, Guyana, Surinam, and 
others have not gone too far-and perhaps that the major aluminum pro-
ducers expect the IBA to achieve its objectives cooperatively. Although all 
the firms operating in Jamaica filed arbitration requests with the Interna-
tional Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) immediately 
after the tax increase, within six months one of the largest (Kaiser) not only 
agreed to abandon ICSID proceedings against Jamaica, but assented to the 
government's purchase of 51% of the firm's bauxite mining assets.J7 In 
return, the company will receive a guarantee on reserves sufficient to main-
tain current rates of extraction for thirty years. Though Kaiser has geo-
graphically less diversified holdings of bauxite than the other majors, and 
was therefore under more pressure to settle, this action was nonetheless a 
significant development. 
A few months after preliminary negotiations with Kaiser were completed, 
another major company, Revere, settled with the Jamaican government on 
much the same terms as established for Kaiser, and also agreed to expand 
its alumina capacity on the island by nearly three-fold.38 The Revere agree-
ment was followed in April 1975 by a settlement between Reynolds Alumi-
num and the Jamaican government. Like Kaiser, both Revere and Reynolds 
agreed to sell to the government 51% interest in the companies' mining 
operations, and both agreed to withdraw proceedings from ICSID.39 
The last two of the North American companies operating in Jamaica, 
Alcan and Alcoa, had not come to terms by May 1975. Because Alcoa 
depends on Jamaican bauxite for only 17% of its aluminum production-
much less than the producers who have already agreed to Jamaican govern-
ment terms-it will probably be the last company to reach an agreement, if 
indeed it decides to remain on the island. 40 
NOTES 
I. The analysis in the remainder of the paper refers to taxes imposed on various products 
or on the profits earned in extracting or processing the products, even though in many cases we 
are dealing with higher royalties, governmentally posted prices, marketing boards, etc., rather 
than with taxes per se. 
2. One of the responses to OPEC's actions has been for petroleum-producing states in the 
United States to raise their taxes on the production and/ or refining of petroleum products in 
an attempt to capture some of the windfall gains generated by the higher prices for oil and 
petroleum products, or to export some of the higher taxes to residents of other states. The 
analysis presented here is of direct relevance in the appraisal of the likely economic effects of such 
taxes. 
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3. These concepts are explained more fully in Helen Hughes, "The Distribution of Gains 
from Foreign Direct Investment in Mineral Development," Southeast Asia Development Ad-
visory Group, Asia Society, SEADAG Papers on Problems of Development in Southeast Asia, 
74-IO(NewYork, 1974). 
The theoretical underpinnings for the analysis presented here are contained in Charles E. 
McLure, Jr., "Commodity Tax Incidence in Open Economies," National Tax Journall7 (June 
1964): 187-204; "The Interstate Exporting of State and Local Taxes: Estimates for 1962," 
National Tax Journa120 (March 1967): 49-75; and "General Equilibrium Incidence Analysis: 
The Harberger Model after Ten Years," Journal of Public Economics 4(1975): 125-161. 
4. We ignore the possibility of coordinated action by consumer nations against producer 
nations. Given the large number of nations that would have to cooperate if such action were to 
be effective, and the rewards from being outside a buyers' cartel in the event of economic war-
fare between consumers and producers, it seems unlikely that cooperation among consumer 
nations will be an important influence in determining the ultimate incidence of the taxes under 
discussion. 
5. Of course, for the purpose of this analysis, if equipment can be transferred to alternative 
uses or shipped to countries in which its output is not subject to tax, it is mobile. On the other 
hand, even in the long run capital may be essentially immobile if repatriation of funds is blocked 
by exchange controls and if investment must be maintained in the taxed industry whether or not 
it is optimal, or even profitable, for the firm to do so. These qualifications illustrate the necessity 
of detailed analysis of individual cases. 
6. Labor may also share in the burden of taxation, even if it is mobile and labor markets 
are competitive, if the tax results in the release of labor from the industry and the labor C!\nnot 
be absorbed into the remainder of the economy without depressing wage rates. The extent to 
which this occurs depends upon the relative importance of the natural resources sector in the 
total economy, whether capital is also shifted to the remainder of the economy, the factor propor-
tions (capital/labor ratios) in the various sectors, and the ease of absorbing labor into the 
remaining sectors, as indicated by elasticities of substition. In what follows we shall ignore this 
complicated qualification, even though in many cases it may be quite important. 
7. For more detailed explanations of this result, see, for example, Richard A. Musgrave and 
Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), pp. 
433-434 and 436-438; and (at a somewhat more advanced level) Richard A. Musgrave, The 
Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 287-299. Briefly, the argument 
is that the tax moves the monopolist away from the price that maximizes profits. Roughly one-
half of the tax is reflected in reduced profits, rather than in either higher prices or lower costs. 
8. The interested reader is referred to Musgrave, Theory of Public Finance, chapter 13, for 
a survey of the subject; and to William Fellner, Competition Among the Few (New York: Knopf, 
1949), for a more detailed survey of oligopoly models. Among the more interesting and poten-
tially important aspects of this subject, and ones that are seldom discussed in theoretical analyses, 
are the relations between firms and nations. Firms might, as they did in Jamaica, band together 
in the effort to prevent increases in taxes. Or they might encourage nations to raise taxes. It has 
been suggested, for example, that the latter course was followed by the international oil com-
panies, since a higher price for OPEC oil would increase the value of the firms' reserves in the 
United States. The question is beyond the scope of this paper, though the analysis presented 
here should prove useful in isolating instances in which firms would act in the two ways just 
described. 
9. In certain cases one or a few purchasing firms acting cooperatively may dominate the 
market for the output of a country or group of countries. The incidence of taxes levied on such 
monopsonistic firms can be analyzed using theoretical constructs similar to those used in the 
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analysis of monopoly. A firm which was monopsonistic in input markets but sold in competitive 
output markets would, as in the monopoly case, bear about half the burden of the tax. But in this 
case the remaining half of the burden would be borne by resource owners, rather than by con-
sumers. A firm that was both a monopolist and a monopsonist could shift about half of the tax 
in each direction, but would nonetheless suffer a reduction in profits. Finally, as is true on the 
product side, oligopsony (few buyers) is more common than monopsony. But the theory of 
oligopsonistic behavior is even less developed than that of oligopoly behavior. Given the tendency 
for collusion among firms in input markets to give way to competition, and the rarity of pure 
monopsony, we ignore the possibility of monopsony in what follows. 
10. We treat export and production taxes together, since for practical purposes they generally 
have similar distributional effects. A third type of tax, the severance tax, is imposed upon the 
removal of the natural resource from the earth. To the extent that the resource can be extracted 
with little marginal cost, such a tax cannot be shifted by the owner of the resource. If non-
residents own the resource, most of the tax will be exported . But costless extraction is unusual, 
and the production-profits distinction will suffice for most purposes. 
We use the term "owner" to identify the persons or organizations who have economic 
interests in the resource during the relevant period of time. This may, of course, be someone 
who has leased the mineral rights from the actual owner. But the legal owner would have an 
economic interest in the resource if the rental payments were based on value of production. 
11. The observant reader might reasonably ask how this conclusion squares with the earlier 
statements-and the observable reality-that the OPEC increases in oil were shifted to consumers. 
The problem is that the price increases were really increases determined by a group of colluding 
owners of resources who had not previously maximized their joint profits, and not taxes per se. 
Furthermore, the quasi-taxes are more like severance taxes than like refining taxes. If present 
prices maximize profits and if the resources in question were owned by some third party, further 
increases in the taxes would be borne primarily by the owners of the resource, rather than being 
shifted forward. 
12. Note that in this case the tax might have an appreciable burden, even if it yielded little 
revenue. In fact the welfare loss could greatly exceed the amount of revenue generated. 
13. The criterion of "success" here is whether or not the organization was able to raise prices 
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